1 what does clifford consider to be
1 what does clifford consider to be
Surely this, that he was verily guilty of the death of those men. It was noted earlier that one way to read Locke is as arguing for P2 via the independent theoretical premise that God's will for us is that we follow Evidentialist norms, together with a divine command theory of moral rightness see Wolterstorff No belief is without effect, he claims: at the very least, believing on insufficient evidence even with respect to an apparently very insignificant issue is liable to lead to the lowering of epistemic standards in other more important contexts too. And this also concerns rational thinking. There are many other variations here. But in general the relation between acts and beliefs seems to be as sketched in Notes 10 and The reason of this judgment is not far to seek: it is that in both these cases the belief held by one man was of great importance to other men. That said, it is possible to imagine a diachronic ethics of belief according to which truth is the sole aim of belief, but we evaluate particular beliefs not just on whether they are true but also on their ability to enable or produce the subsequent acquisition of other true beliefs. Another relevant consideration, apart from ability and opportunity, is that one often is pressed for time, and forced to make choices, and indeed forced to make these choices also in far less ideal, quiet and unconstrained circumstances than one believes their importance merits. B is towards the top of the scale in terms of reflective access requirements: S has to know that he has E and that believing that p is likely to make E obtain. And these are especially those matters about which they have strong religious or political prejudices, or in which they have a strong personal interest. Andrews University: Macfarlane.. Note 34 : A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor says so, or the assembly so determine, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy. As permissive as this sounds, however, James is by no means writing a blank doxastic check. The reason is that it might and indeed would be different if some of ones other beliefs that entered into this particular belief were different - and the same holds again for these other beliefs.
Finally, norms and types of norms can be in outright tension. B is towards the top of the scale in terms of reflective access requirements: S has to know that he has E and that believing that p is likely to make E obtain.
The ethics of belief clifford
If a belief is founded rationally, it is consistent and based on real evidence. Whether or not these parallels are illuminating, and whether a view in the ethics of belief constrains our options in the ethics of action, is still an open question see Kornblith , Dougherty For more on hypothetical norms generally, see Broome and Schroeder The structure of moral and epistemic norms can also be construed hypothetically in this way. And unfortunately so far in any normal society this type of human being - say: the rational kind - has been in a minority, even though it is a minority from which most contributors to science and civilization issued. Surely this, that he was verily guilty of the death of those men. Even then, however, we are obliged to have some sort of evidence before giving our assent. Perhaps the best place to make a distinction between moderate Evidentialism and full-blown Non-Evidentialism is over whether a subject can be not only permitted but also obliged to form a belief on insufficient evidence or, depending on the reflective access conditions, on what she takes to be insufficient evidence in certain situations. Accordingly, at least some sort of moderate or context-specific Evidentialism seems overwhelmingly plausible. But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself credulous. The epistemic norm to gather as much evidence as possible may conflict with the prudential norm to believe in such a way as to save time and effort example: the fastidious boss who never hires anyone until he has investigated a candidate's entire past, called every reference, and confirmed every qualification. An awful privilege, and an awful responsibility, that we should help to create the world in which posterity will live. The text of Clifford's essay that I reproduce on my site is the full text, to which I have made 94 notes, divided over three files.
This might seem strange given that we are talking about a Victorian Briton whose most famous philosophical work is an essay nearly years ago.
But at the same time they might think it permissible to abandon these strict standards in ordinary contexts where not much is at stake—for instance, the everyday belief that there is still some milk in the fridge.
It is also possible to argue that the aim of belief makes it the case that we have practical reasons for thinking that only epistemic reasons can license belief Whiting How to cite this essay Choose cite format:. Epistemic alertness is a much more precious virtue today than it ever was, since the need to sift through conflicting information has exponentially increased, and the risk of becoming a vessel of credulity is just a few taps of a smartphone away.
They would not be innocent, they would only be not found out. Note 35 : He who begins by loving Christianity better than Truth, will proceed by loving his own sect or Church better than Christianity, and end loving himself better than all.
The ethics of belief clifford premises
If we have a theory according to which the aim of belief is complex, however, then parallels to the ethics of action become more complicated. The ship was fairly old and had needed repairs in the past but instead of overhauling and refitting the ship, the owner chose to rather save the money and send the ship to sea with the belief that it would be safe and seaworthy. Epistemic alertness is a much more precious virtue today than it ever was, since the need to sift through conflicting information has exponentially increased, and the risk of becoming a vessel of credulity is just a few taps of a smartphone away. Similarly, if we discover that following moral norms of belief reliably leads to the acquisition of knowledge, then there may be a track-record argument that goes from epistemic norms to moral norms this would effectively be an empirical argument in support of P2 above. Surely this, that he was verily guilty of the death of those men. Would this make any difference in the guilt of the accusers? A common candidate here, of course, is knowledge itself see Williamson , Pritchard , Simion et al. Note 7 : "Let us vary this case also, and suppose, other things remaining as before, that a still more accurate investigation proved the accused to have been really guilty. As to what prompts the decisions of our will: I do not believe one's beliefs "prompt" these, but I do believe one's beliefs guide and constrain one's decisions - which are prompted by one's will, which is a separate faculty apart and independent from one's beliefs, as is shown by the fact that one can always, possibly perversely, decide and will to act counter to what one believes is right.
If a belief is not realized immediately in open deeds, it is stored up for the guidance of the future. If evidence is not merely in the head, so to speak, then the possession condition in Evidentialist norms may turn out to be quite complex.
Put more generally: if you have a prudential end E, and belief that p is likely to make E obtain, then you have a prima facie obligation to believe that p.
False beliefs about physical or social facts lead us into poor habits of action that in the most extreme cases could threaten our survival. Note 20 : "Whoso would deserve well of his fellows in this matter will guard the purity of his beliefs with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away.
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